MESSAGE
| DATE | 2024-02-12 |
| FROM | Ruben Safir
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| SUBJECT | Subject: [Hangout - NYLXS] The Hezbollah Threat - why war in the north can
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Hezbollah’s Radwan unit is capable of carrying out an invasion of the
Galilee at any given moment.
Tal Beeri
November 29, 2023
Photo: Logo of Hezbollah’s specialized force they call “Radwan”.
For the past two years, it seems that Hezbollah has been preparing for a
confrontation in the north. We have written and published quite a bit
about it. In the summer of 2022, in the final stages of negotiations
between Israel and Lebanon on the maritime agreement, the name of the
Radwan unit made headlines, since its operatives were put on alert and
deployed, openly and unusually, in static positions along the border
with Israel under the familiar cover of the “Green Without Borders”
association. Radwan Unit operatives joined operatives of Hezbollah’s
geographic units “Nasser” and “Aziz,” which are permanently stationed
adjacent to the border with Israel.
After the attack tunnels were discovered in December 2018 and Israel
built a ground-physical barrier, the Radwan unit recalculated its route
and continued to train in preparation for its main mission: to
infiltrate Israeli territory and take over Israeli territories, bases,
and communities in the Galilee.
In our assessment, since the beginning of the summer of 2022, the Radwan
unit has reached the operational capability to fulfill its mission to
invade Galilee. In light of the accumulation of incidents on the
northern border up until October 2023, we assess that Hezbollah was on
the verge of deciding to authorize the invasion. The Radwan unit,
Hezbollah’s aerial unit, and geographic units in southern Lebanon were
awaiting the order.
How did Hezbollah plan to invade the Galilee?
Stage 1 (Nasser/Aziz Geographical Units) – The geographic units in
southern Lebanon are responsible for opening fire by means of massive
rocket and mortar fire along the entire border, including firing into
Israeli territory. In addition, they are responsible for neutralizing
surveillance devices along the border by means of sniper fire, exploding
UAVs, suicide UAVs (under the responsibility of the air unit), and
anti-tank fire.
Stage 2 (Radwan unit) – Simulatively, along with the above attack and
the neutralization of the surveillance devices, Radwan Unit operatives
are expected to storm the barrier throughout the entire sector, breach
the barrier at various points and by various means (powerful IEDs, and
possibly even booby-trapped tunnels dug under the barrier).
Stage 3 (Radwan unit) – Radwan operatives will cross on foot and with
vehicles (mainly motorcycles and ATVs) above ground into Israeli
territory and move towards the communities and military bases near the
border. It is possible that some of the operatives, according to advance
planning, will try to reach targets deep inside the territory of the
State of Israel.
***Note: The working assumption must take into account that there are
still attack tunnels that the IDF has not yet exposed, and if so, they
will be utilized at this stage.
Stage 4 (Radwan unit) – Gaining control of bases and communities,
executing killings, and taking hostages as bargaining chips. In
addition, the transfer of abductees to Lebanese territory, with an
emphasis on soldiers.
Stage 5 (Radwan unit) – Barricading, deploying and waiting for IDF
forces while positioning anti-tank and light anti-aircraft squads and
snipers.
The role of Hezbollah’s aerial unit is to accompany the entire operation
by using UAVs for intelligence gathering and attacks (suicide UAVs).
Operatives from the geographic units (Nasser/Aziz) will serve as
reinforcements as needed throughout the above stages.
October 7, 2023 – Hamas attack postponed Hezbollah’s campaign.
In this article, we do not intend to analyze whether the Hamas operation
on October 7 was coordinated with the Iranians and Hezbollah, and if it
was coordinated, whether only in principle or was it also coordinated
specifically in terms of the time of its execution. In practice, on
October 7, Hamas effectively copied the invasion plan of the Radwan unit
and implemented it, through its Nukhba units (and its naval unit), on
the southern border with the Gaza Strip.
In effect, Hamas’ action postponed the timing of Hezbollah’s invasion
plan. Hezbollah is not interested in being dragged after the
Palestinians. However, it is our assessment that as far as Hezbollah is
concerned, it is not a question of if. In light of the circumstances,
Hezbollah will have to make a new decision on the timing – when?
Is such a scenario relevant these days on the northern border? Can the
Radwan unit implement its attack plan today?
The events of October 7 proved again that any physical or technological
obstacle will inevitably be breached. It should be remembered that,
unlike the Gaza Strip, along the border with Lebanon there are sections
where the barrier has not yet been upgraded, which could make it even
easier to penetrate. The mostly mountainous terrain on the Lebanese
border is more difficult to maneuver than the flat terrain on the border
with the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, it allows for more concealed
movement. Hezbollah is well acquainted with the terrain and knows how to
take advantage of it.
There is no doubt that the large concentration of Israeli forces along
the border with Lebanon and the readiness of the IDF’s operational and
intelligence forces since October 7 greatly undermines the element of
surprise, which is a very important component of Hezbollah’s plan of action.
Nonetheless, it is our assessment that even today, at any given time, if
it so desires, Hezbollah can implement its operational plan to invade
Israeli territory with a smaller Radwan unit force and into a more
limited area. In light of the existing limitations, we estimate that
Hezbollah is able to do so with a smaller force of a few dozen to a few
hundred Radwan operatives (100-200), compared to the original plan,
which in our assessment, included hundreds to two thousand operatives. A
lower signature will make it difficult to monitor intelligence and
provide an early warning.
In light of the fact that most of the Israeli population living near the
border has been evacuated, in our assessment, Hezbollah can focus on a
limited area, with an emphasis on military zones and/or taking over the
territory of a small number of communities.
Radwan’s unit’s competence has not been affected.
Even if most of the Radwan operatives have distanced themselves from the
border since the beginning of the war, in our assessment this does not
neutralize their ability to fulfill their main objective. It is our
assessment that the Radwan unit is continuing to collect intelligence
near the border and is making adjustments to its operational plans. As
of this writing, around 90 Hezbollah operatives have been killed since
October 7. It seems that some of those killed were operatives and
commanders in the Radwan unit. The number of operatives killed has no
bearing on Hezbollah’s overall competence or the Radwan unit in particular.
The capability of the rocket and mortar arrays has not been affected.
According to our assessment, Hezbollah’s short-range rocket and mortar
arrays, which are a critical component in carrying out the first stage
of the invasion into Israeli territory, are fully capable and ready for
operation in the immediate future. In view of the large scale
(deployment and arsenal) of these arrays, it is our assessment that the
IDF attacks only damaged them in a particular area.
In conclusion, the Radwan unit still poses a significant challenge for
the IDF and still poses a clear and present danger. As time passes and
the war ends, the scope of IDF forces in the north will probably
decrease significantly. The main mission of the Radwan unit was and
still remains to penetrate into Israeli territory and take over
communities and geographical areas. This threat to Israel has not passed
and is relevant at any given time. Hezbollah only needs to decide when.
Israel must act to neutralize the threat posed by the Radwan unit. Even
removing Radwan operatives from the border will not neutralize this
threat. In our assessment, given Hezbollah’s decision, the Radwan unit
will now be able to prepare an infiltration operation into Israeli
territory, with a low signature and will be able to carry out this
operation in a focused and swift manner. Even more so, when the scope of
the IDF deployment is diluted and civilians return to their homes.
In light of this, we believe that the IDF must act and cause direct and
extensive damage to the infrastructure of the Radwan unit and its
operatives.
Note – we intend to publish an article on the subject: Why the current
reality on the Lebanese–Israeli border is unsustainable – Possible
scenarios for the day after the war.
--
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that Brooklyn, like Atlantis, reaches mythological
proportions in the mind of the world - RI Safir 1998
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Being so tracked is for FARM ANIMALS and extermination camps,
but incompatible with living as a free human being. -RI Safir 2013
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