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| DATE | 2015-09-10 |
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Subject: "Middle East Provocations and Predictions" (long) – Daniel
Pipes in Mackenzie Inst., #1423
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 20:25:48 -0400 (EDT)
From: D. Pipes Mailing List
Reply-To: D. Pipes Mailing List
To: ruben-at-mrbrklyn.com
"Middle East Provocations and Predictions" (long) -- Daniel Pipes in
Mackenzie Inst., #1423
Middle East Provocations and Predictions
by Daniel Pipes
Mackenzie Institute
September 9, 2015
http://www.danielpipes.org/16103/middle-east-provocations-and-predictions
The Middle East stands out as the world's most volatile, combustible,
and troubled region; not coincidentally, it also inspires the most
intense policy debates -- think of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Iran
deal. The following tour d'horizon offers interpretations and
speculations on Iran, ISIS, Syria-Iraq, the Kurds, Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Israel, Islamism, then concludes with some thoughts on policy
choices. My one-sentence conclusion: some good news lies under the
onslaught of misunderstandings, mistakes, and misery.
Iran
Iran is Topic No. 1 these days, especially since the nuclear deal the
six great powers reached with its rulers in Vienna on July 14. The
"Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" seeks to bring Tehran in from the
cold, ending decades of hostility and inducing Iran to become a more
normal state. In itself, this is an entirely worthy endeavor.
The problem lies in the execution, which has been execrable, rewarding
an aggressive government with legitimacy and additional funding, not
requiring serious safeguards on its nuclear arms program, and permitting
that program in about a decade. The annals of diplomacy have never
witnessed a comparable capitulation by great powers to an isolated, weak
state.
The Iranian leadership has an apocalyptic mindset and preoccupation with
the end of days that does not apply to the North Koreans, Stalin, Mao,
the Pakistanis or anyone else. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i et al. have
reason to use these weapons for reasons outside of the normal military
concerns -- to bring on the end of the world. This makes it especially
urgent to stop them.
Economic sanctions, however, amount to a sideshow, even a distraction.
The Iranian government compares to the North Korean in its absolute
devotion to building these weapons and its readiness to do whatever it
takes, whether mass starvation or some other calamity, to achieve them.
Therefore, no matter how severely applied, the sanctions only make life
more difficult for the Iranian leadership without actually stopping the
nuclear buildup.
The only way to stop the buildup is through the use of force. I hope the
Israeli government -- the only one left that might take action -- will
undertake this dangerous and thankless job. It can do so through aerial
bombardment, special operations, or nuclear weapons, with option #2 both
the most attractive and the most difficult.
If the Israelis do not stop the bomb, a nuclear device in the hands of
the mullahs will have terrifying consequences for the Middle East and
beyond, including North America, where a devastating electromagnetic
pulse attack must be considered possible.
To the contrary, if the Iranians do not deploy their new weapons, it is
just possible that the increased contact with the outside world and the
disruption caused by inconsistent Western policies will work to
undermine the regime.
ISIS
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (aka ISIS, ISIL, Islamic State,
Daesh) is the topic that consumes the most attention other than Iran. I
agree with Ron Dermer, the Israeli ambassador to Washington, that Iran
is a thousand times more dangerous than ISIS. But ISIS is also a
thousand times more interesting. Plus, the Obama administration finds it
a useful bogeyman to justify working with Tehran.
Emerging out of almost nowhere, the group has taken Islamic nostalgia to
an unimagined extreme. The Saudis, the ayatollahs, the Taliban, Boko
Haram, and Shabaab each imposed its version of a medieval order. But
ISIS went further, replicating as best it can a seventh-century Islamic
environment, down to such specifics as public beheading and enslavement.
This effort has provoked two opposite responses among Muslims. One is
favorable, as manifested by Muslims coming from Tunisia and the West,
attracted moth-like to an incandescently pure vision of Islam. The
other, more important, response is negative. The great majority of
Muslims, not to speak of non-Muslims, are alienated by the violent and
flamboyant ISIS phenomenon. In the long term, ISIS will harm the
Islamist movement (the one aspiring to apply Islamic law in its
entirety) and even Islam itself, as Muslims in large numbers abominate ISIS.
One thing about ISIS will likely last, however: the notion of the
caliphate. The last caliph who actually gave orders ruled in the 940s.
That's the 940s, not the 1940s, over a thousand years ago. The
reappearance of an executive caliph after centuries of figurehead
caliphs has prompted considerable excitement among Islamists. In Western
terms, it's like someone reviving the Roman Empire with a piece of
territory in Europe; that would get everybody's attention. I predict the
caliphate will have a lasting and negative impact.
Syria, Iraq, and the Kurds
In certain circles, Syria and Iraq have come to be known as Suraqiya,
joining their names together as the border has collapsed and they have
each simultaneously been divided into three main regions: a
Shiite-oriented central government, a Sunni Arab rebellion, and a
Kurdish part that wants out.
This is a positive development; there's nothing sacred about the
British-French Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 which created these two
polities. Quite the contrary, that accord has proven an abject failure;
conjure up the names of Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein to remember
why. These miserable states exist for the benefit of their monstrous
leaders who proceed to murder their own subjects. So, let them fracture
into threes, improving matters for the locals and the outside world.
As Turkish-backed Sunni jihadis fight Iranian-backed Shi'i jihadis in
Suraqiya, the West should stand back from the fighting. Neither side
deserves support; this is not our fight. Indeed, these two evil forces
at each others' throats means they have less opportunity to aggress on
the rest of the world. If we do wish to help, it should be directed
first to the many victims of the civil war; if we want to be strategic,
help the losing side (so neither side wins).
As for the massive flow of refugees from Syria: Western governments
should not take in large numbers but instead pressure Saudi Arabia and
other rich Middle Eastern states to offer sanctuary. Why should the
Saudis be exempt from the refugee flow, especially when their country
has many advantages over, say, Sweden: linguistic, cultural, and
religious compatibility, as well as proximity and a similar climate.
The rapid emergence of a Kurdish polity in Iraq, followed by one in
Syria, as well as a new assertiveness in Turkey and rumblings in Iran
are a positive sign. Kurds have proven themselves to be responsible in a
way that none of their neighbors have. I say this as someone who, 25
years ago, opposed Kurdish autonomy. Let us help the Kurds who are as
close to an ally as we have in the Muslim Middle East. Not just separate
Kurdish units should come into existence but also a unified Kurdistan
made up from parts of all four countries. That this harms the
territorial integrity of those states does not present a problem, as not
one of them works well as presently constituted.
Turkey
The June 2015 election turned out not so well for the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi, or AKP), the party that's
single-handedly been ruling Turkey since 2002. It's an Islamist party
but more importantly of late, it is the party of tyranny. Recep Tayyip
Erdo?an, its dominant figure, does as he wishes, gaining undue influence
over the banks, the media, the schools, the courts, law enforcement, the
intelligence services, and the military. He overrides customs, rules,
regulations, and even the constitution in the block-by-block building of
a one-man rule. He's the Middle Eastern version of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez.
For the most part, Erdo?an has played by democratic rules, via elections
and parliament, which has served him well. But the June election could
spell the end of his self-restraint. Long ago, when mayor of Istanbul,
he signaled that he ultimately does not accept the verdict of elections,
stating that democracy is like a bus: "You ride it until you arrive at
your destination, then you step off." He has now reached that
destination and appears ready to step off. He has initiated hostilities
against the Kurdish PKK group as an ugly electoral tactic (to win over
Turkish nationalists); he might go so far as to start a war between now
and the Nov. 1 snap elections, taking advantage of a constitutional
provision deferring elections in time of war.
Accordingly, the June electoral setback will not prove much of an
obstacle to Erdo?an, whose path to tyranny remains open.
Erdo?an's undoing will likely not be domestic, nor will it concern a
relative triviality like votes; it will be foreign and concern larger
issues. Precisely because he has done so well domestically, he believes
himself a master politician on the global stage and pursues a foreign
policy as aggressive as his domestic one. But, after some initial
successes of the "Zero problems with neighbors" policy, Turkey's
international standing lies in tatters. Ankara has bad relations or
major problems with nearly every neighbor: Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran,
Syria, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Greek Cyprus, Turkish Cyprus, and Greece, as
well as the United States and China. Some foreign escapade will likely
be Erdo?an's undoing.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is the most unusual country in the world. Even if you're
from, say, Qatar or Abu Dhabi, its social mores and governmental
institutions are strange. It hosts, for example, not a single movie
house. Men and women use separate elevators. Non-Muslims are forbidden
to enter two of its cities (Mecca and Medina). A vice squad terrorizes
the population. Christians get in trouble for praying, Jews are with
rare exceptions prohibited.
The government runs a powerful, competent police state with few
pretenses of elections, a constitution, or the other rigmarole of
dictatorships. It observes, censors and intrudes. Police checkpoints
proliferate. The government employs three different military
forces--Pakistani mercenaries to defend the oilfields, a national army
to protect the borders, and a tribal guard to protect the monarchy.
Monarchies typically count 10, 20, or even 50 members in the royal
family; the Al Saud has around 10,000 males (females don't count
politically) and they constitute a nomenklatura, to use that helpful
Soviet term. Family members run the country, which has been called the
only family business with a seat at the United Nations.
But this structure now stands in danger. For 70 years, the monarchy
looked to the U.S. government to provide external security. Now, for the
first time, in the age of Obama, that assurance no longer exists, and
especially not after the Iran deal, in which Washington aligned more
closely with Tehran than with Riyadh. The Saudi leadership is taking
steps to protect itself, the most notable one of which is working with
Israel. It's a logical step, but still it's mildly astonishing. My
prediction: it's temporary and will not outlast the crisis. Should a
Republican become president in 2017, the relationship with Israel will
close down.
Egypt
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has now been in power for two years, since July
2013, in the aftermath of a massive demonstration against the Muslim
Brotherhood president, Mohamed Morsi. Sisi has the right priorities in
mind: suppressing the Islamists and fixing the economy. But I worry
about his achieving success in either arena.
No one despises Islamists more than me. I endorse tough measures to
battle this totalitarian movement, such as rejecting their efforts to
apply Islamic law, excluding them from mainstream institutions, and
banning their representatives from elections. But Sisi's heavy-handed
and extra-legal policies go too far and are counterproductive. For
example, sentencing nearly 600 people to death for the murder of a
policeman, followed a month later by sentencing another near 700 people
for the same murder, is not only massively disproportionate but also
likely to backfire and help the Islamists gain sympathy.
The economy is the other major problem. In the 1950s, Gamal Abdel
Nasser, also a military officer, put in place a socialist regime typical
of that era, with great Soviet-style factories badly attempting import
substitution. Not only is that system still in place but the state's
economic role grew substantially under Mubarak and continues to grow
further under Sisi. Both presidents keep retired military colleagues
happy by giving them sinecures. "You're a retired colonel? Good, take
over this cotton factory" or "Start this desert town." Estimates suggest
that about 25 to 40 percent of the Egyptian economy hobbles as part of
"Military, Inc."
Also, a disdain for agriculture creates enormous problems, so that
Egypt, both in absolute and relative terms, imports more of its caloric
intake than any other country. For example, figures for the fiscal year
2013-14 show that Egypt imported 5.46 million tons of wheat, or 60
percent of the country's total consumption, making it the world's
largest wheat importer. Once the breadbasket of the Nile, Egypt can no
longer feed itself but instead depends on the Saudis and others for
subventions to purchase food abroad. The recent gas field discovery in
the Mediterranean will help, but will not solve this problem.
Sisi appears as unprepared to serve as president of Egypt as was another
military man, Gamal Abdul Nasser, 60 years ago. In the acerbic analysis
of the American analyst Lee Smith:
It's not an accident that an Egypt in decline gets a man like Sisi to
step forward. Prideful and incompetent, Sisi nonetheless sees himself as
part of a continuum of great Egyptian leaders, like Nasser as well as
Anwar al-Sadat. Sisi told a journalist in an off-the record interview
leaked to the media that he's been dreaming about his own greatness for
35 years. But the many choices Sisi made to get there show him to be
dangerously over his head.
He still rides high, with impressive popularity ratings (recall the
cookies and pajamas bearing his face), but should he falter, that
support will quickly evaporate. Islamists will exploit his incompetence
no less than he took advantage of their failures. The cycle of coups
d'état threatens to repeat, with Egypt falling further behind, the
precipice of disaster looming closer along with the prospect of massive
emigration. I wish Sisi well but am braced for the worst.
Israel
In November 2000, Ehud Barak said that Israel resembles "a villa located
in a jungle." I love that expression; and how much truer it is today,
with ISIS on Israel's Syrian and Sinai borders, Lebanon and Jordan
groaning under unsustainable refugee influxes, the West Bank in anarchy,
and Gaza approaching the same?
Everyone knows about Israel's high-tech capabilities and military
prowess. But much more about it is impressive bordering on extraordinary.
Demography: The entire modern, industrial world from South Korea to
Sweden is unable to replace itself demographically, with the single,
outstanding exception of Israel. Societies need roughly 2.1 children per
woman to sustain their populations. Iceland, France, and Ireland come in
just below that level, but then the numbers descend down to Hong Kong
with its 1.1 children per woman, or just over half of what's necessary
for a country to survive long term. Well, Israel is at 3.0. Yes, the
Arabs and the Haredim partly explain that high number, but it also
depends on secular Tel Aviv residents. It's nearly unprecedented
development for a modern country to have more children over time.
Energy: Everyone knows the old quip about Moses taking a wrong turn on
leaving Egypt. Well no, it turns out he didn't. Israel has as large an
energy reserve as--get this--Saudi Arabia. Now, this resource is not as
accessible, so it's far more expensive and complex to exploit than
Arabia's enormous and shallow pools of oil, but it's there and Israelis
will someday extract it.
Illegal immigration: This is a brewing crisis for Europe, especially in
summertime, when the Mediterranean and the Balkans become highways from
the Middle East. Israel is the one Western country that has handled this
problem by building fences that give control over borders.
Water: Twenty years ago, like everyone else in the Middle East, the
Israelis suffered from water shortages. They then solved this problem
through conservation, drip agriculture, new methods of desalination, and
intensive recycling. One statistic: Spain is the country with the
second-highest percentage of recycling, around 18 percent. Israel does
the most recycling, at 90 percent, five times more than Spain. Israel's
now so awash in water that it exports some to neighbors.
In all, Israel's doing exceptionally well. Of course, it is under the
threat of weapons of mass destruction and the delegitimization process.
But it has a record of accomplishment that I believe will see it through
these challenges.
Islamist Ideology: Three Types
Islamists can be broken down into three main forces:
Shiite revolutionaries: Spearheaded by the Iranian regime, they are on
the warpath, relying on Tehran's help, apocalyptic ideology, subversion,
and (eventually) nuclear weaponry. They want to overturn the existing
world order and replace it with the Islamic one envisioned by Ayatollah
Khomeini. The revolutionaries' strength lies in their determination;
their weakness lies in their minority status, for Shiites make up just
10 percent or so of the total Muslim population and further divide into
multiple sub-groups such as the Fivers, Seveners, and Twelvers.
Sunni revisionists: They deploy varied tactics in the common effort to
overthrow the existing order. At one extreme stand the crazies -- ISIS,
Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Shabaab, and the Taliban, hate-filled, violent,
and yet more revolutionary than their Shiite counterparts. The Muslim
Brotherhood and its affiliates (such as President Erdo?an of Turkey)
fill the middle ground, using violence only when deemed necessary but
preferring to work through the system. Soft Islamists like Fethullah
Gülen, Pennsylvania's Turkish preacher living in self-exile, forward
their vision through education and commerce and work strictly within the
system, but whose goals, despite their mild tactics, are no less ambitious.
Sunni status-quo maintainers: The Saudi state heads a bloc of
governments (GCC members, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco), only some of
which are Islamist, that wish to hold onto what they have and fend off
the revolutionaries and revisionists.
Islamist Tactics: Violent vs. Lawful
Violent Islamists, Shiite and Sunni alike, are doomed. Their attacks on
fellow Muslims alienate coreligionists. They challenge non-Muslims in
precisely those areas where the latter are strongest; the combined might
of the military, law enforcement, and the intelligence services can
crush any Islamist uprising.
Islamist violence is counterproductive. Its drumbeat quality teaches and
moves public opinion. Murderous assaults move opinion, not the analysts,
the media, or politicians. An incident like the Charlie Hebdo massacre
in Paris moves voters over to anti-Islamic parties. Blood in the streets
teaches. It's education by murder.
In contrast, lawful Islamists working within the system are very
dangerous. They are seen as respectable, appearing on television,
appearing as lawyers in courtrooms, and teaching classes. Western
governments mistakenly treat them as allies against the crazies. My rule
of thumb: The less violent the Islamist, the more dangerous.
Therefore, were I an Islamist strategist, I'd say, "Work through the
system. Cut the violence except on those rare occasions when it
intimidates and helps reach the goal." In fact, the Islamists are not
doing this, to their detriment. They are making a major mistake, to our
benefit.
Islamism in Decline?
The Islamist movement could be on the way down due to infighting and
unpopularity.
As recently as 2012, it appeared able to overcome the many internal
tensions -- sectarian (Sunni, Shiite), political (monarchical,
republican), tactical (political, violent), attitudes toward modernity
(Salafi, Muslim Brotherhood), and personal (Fethullah Gülen, Recep
Tayyip Erdo?an). Since then, however, Islamists can't stop fighting each
other. This fits an historic Middle Eastern pattern in which a
victorious element tends to split. As it approaches power, differences
become increasingly divisive. Rivalries papered over in opposition
emerge when power is at hand.
Second, to know Islamists is to reject them. The massive Egyptian
demonstrations after one year of Muslim Brotherhood rule offer the
strongest piece of evidence for this conclusion. Other indications come
from Iran (where a great majority of the population despises its
government) and Turkey (where votes for the ruling Islamist party just
went down by 20 percent).
Should these tendencies hold, the Islamist movement cannot succeed. Some
already see the "post-Islamization" era as underway. Here is Haidar
Ibrahim Ali of the Sudan:
We are witnessing the end of political Islam's era, which began in the
mid-1970s, to be replaced by what Iranian intellectual Asef Bayat
described as a "post-Islamization" era, when politically and socially,
following a period of trials, political Islam's vitality and
attractiveness have been exhausted even among the most ardent of its
supporters and enthusiasts.
These problems offer grounds for optimism but not for complacency, for
trendlines can change again. The challenge of marginalizing Islamism
remains alive.
Three Middle Eastern Political Forces
>From a Western point of view, Middle Eastern political forces divide into three: the Islamist, the liberal, and the greedy. Each requires a specific approach.
We should reject any and all that is Islamist. As much as possible, this
means not dealing with and never helping Islamists, whether as seemingly
democratic as the ruling party in Turkey or as maniacal as the ISIS
militias, for they all aspire to the same ugly goal of imposing Islamic
law. Just as we're wall-to-wall anti-fascist, let us similarly be
resolutely anti-Islamist. That said, we have a major relationships with
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other states, so raison d'état requires
tactical compromises.
In contrast, we should always favor those called liberals, moderns,
seculars, or Tahrir-Square types; they aspire to a better Middle East
and are the region's hope. We in the West are their model; they look to
us for moral and practical sustenance. The West must stand by them
because, however distant from the corridors of power and forlorn their
circumstances, they point to a better future.
The third group, that of greedy kings, emirs, presidents and other
dictators, requires more nuance. We should cooperate with them but also
constantly pressure them to improve. For example, with the exception of
a mere two years, 2005-06, Western governments did not pressure Hosni
Mubarak, the tyrant who ruled Egypt for 30 years; we didn't encourage
political participation, advocate for the rule of law, or demand
personal freedoms. Had we consistently taken those steps, Egypt would be
in a much better place.
In sum: reject Islamists, accept liberals, deal warily with dictators.
American Policy
U.S. foreign policy has been thoroughly inconsistent the past fifteen years:
In a high-minded way, George W. Bush tried to attain too much in the
Middle East--a free and prosperous Iraq, a transformed Afghanistan, a
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, democracy throughout. Brushing up
against the region's hard realities, he failed in all these efforts.
Barack Obama did the opposite--too little--and he too failed. Boiled to
its essence, his policy amounts to "Downgrade US interests, snub
friends, and seek consensus." He snubbed the Iranian uprising, abandoned
long-standing allies, tried to leave the region to pivot to Asia.
This outlook marks the president as a standard-issue American leftist,
not an outlier. Although he was born and raised a Muslim, this
background does not have a perceptible impact on his policies. His
political views alone explain his outlook.
Iran is the one (inexplicable) exception to this pattern: the past 6½
years reveal that Iran -- and not China, Russia, Mexico, Syria or Israel
-- has been Obama's top foreign affairs priority.
I suggest a US policy between these two extremes: one defined by the
protection of Americans and American interests. Promoting American
interests offers a guideline to decide where to get involved and where
not to. This also has a benign impact on allied countries, such as Canada.
Conclusion
A region notorious for its problems also offers some good news. Tyranny
is shakier than five years ago. Islamists are weakened by their
infighting and unpopularity. The foul Syrian and Iraqi states are dying,
Kurdistan is emerging. Israel is flourishing. Gulf Arabs, especially in
Dubai and Abu Dhabi, are experimenting with new paths to modernity. So,
amid a sea of misfortune and even horrors, there are also some wisps of
hope in the Middle East. Policy makers should note these and build on them.
Mr. Pipes (DanielPipes.org, -at-DanielPipes) is president of the Middle
East Forum. © 2015 All rights reserved by Daniel Pipes.
Related Articles:
* Hello, Kurdistan
* Fixing Egypt's Economy: No More Military Macaroni
* Why America Can't Save the Kurds
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